

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine
Electric Utility De-Energization of Power
Lines in Dangerous Conditions

Rulemaking 18-12-005
(Filed December 13, 2018)

**CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CHOICE ASSOCIATION PROPOSAL IN RESPONSE TO
ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER'S PHASE 2 SCOPING MEMO AND RULING**



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Irene K. Moosen
Director, Regulatory Affairs
**CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
CHOICE ASSOCIATION**
One Concord Center
2300 Clayton Road, Suite 1150
Concord, CA 94521
Email: Regulatory@cal-cca.org

Table of Contents

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	BACKGROUND	1
III.	CALCCA PROPOSAL ON PHASE 2, TRACK 1 ISSUES.....	2
	<i>Issue 1: Definitions And Standard Nomenclature.....</i>	<i>2</i>
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(a) – Critical Facilities And Infrastructure:.....	2
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(b) – Medical Baseline	7
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(c) – Transmission and Distribution:.....	8
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(d) – PSPS Timeline:.....	9
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(e) – Other Definitions:	9
	<i>Issue 2: Access and Functional Needs (AFN) Populations.....</i>	<i>11</i>
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 2(a) – Contact Lists:	12
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 2(a)(i) – Information Sharing Laws/Policies:	13
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 2(b) – AFN Notification:.....	13
	<i>Issue 3: PSPS Strategy And Decision-Making.....</i>	<i>14</i>
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 3(a) – Measure of Last Resort:.....	14
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 3(b) – Standardized Wildfire Risk Criteria:	15
	<i>Issue 4: Notification And Communication</i>	<i>18</i>
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 4(a) – PSPS Communications:	18
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 4(b) – Role of CCAs:	27
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 4(c) – Additional Communications Guidelines:	28
	<i>Issue 5: PSPS And Transmission Lines.....</i>	<i>29</i>
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 5(a) – Coordination for Transmission-Level PSPS:	29
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 5(a)(i) – Additional Coordination:	30
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 5(b) – Evaluation of Transmission PSPS Impacts:	31
	<i>Issue 6: Lessons Learned</i>	<i>31</i>
	CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 6(a) – Lessons Learned	31
IV.	ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN PHASE 2, TRACK 2	32
V.	CONCLUSION.....	39
	APPENDIX A: Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) Priority Tier Categorization	A-1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the *Assigned Commissioner’s Phase 2 Scoping Memo and Ruling* (Phase 2 Scoping Memo), issued August 14, 2019 the California Community Choice Association (“CalCCA”), the trade association representing Community Choice Aggregators (“CCAs”), submits this proposal in response to questions posed by the Assigned Commissioner in the Phase 2 Scoping Memo.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 13, 2018, the California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “CPUC”) opened Rulemaking (“R.”) 18-12-005 to examine its rules allowing electric investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”) to de-energize power lines in case of dangerous conditions that threaten life or property in California. In Phase 1, the Commission examined and adopted Public Safety Power Shutoff (“PSPS”)¹ guidelines, focusing primarily on notification, communication and outreach, in advance of the 2019 wildfire season. Phase 1 culminated in adoption of Decision (“D.”) 19-05-042 on May 31, 2019 (“Phase 1 Decision”). The guidelines adopted in the Phase 1 Decision, along with the guidelines previously adopted in 2018 in Resolution 8 of the Electric Safety and Reliability Branch (“ESRB-8”), are the entirety of the guidelines that are currently in effect governing the electric IOUs’ PSPS programs.² Per the Phase 2 Scoping Memo, the purpose of Phase 2 is for the Commission to examine issues that were outside the scope of Phase 1, and for the Commission to

¹ In accordance with the Phase 2 Scoping Memo, discussion of “de-energization” will be referred to as Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS).

² See D.19-05-042, Appendix A “*De-Energization (Public Safety Power Shut-Off) Guidelines.*”

revisit issues from Phase 1 that require additional examination and development. As part of Phase 2, the Commission will direct the development of comprehensive PSPS guidelines building upon those adopted in Resolution ESRB-8, the Phase 1 Decision and guidelines adopted in Phase 2.

III. CALCCA PROPOSAL ON PHASE 2, TRACK 1 ISSUES

Issue 1: Definitions And Standard Nomenclature

- a) *Should the Commission adopt an updated definition of Critical Facilities to include the transportation sector, Department of Defense Facilities or other sectors?*
- b) *Are there any differences among the IOU's medical baseline tariffs and medical baseline designations that should be updated to promote consistency across utilities for the PSPS programs?*
- c) *What voltage level should be used to designate "distribution" versus "transmission" for PSPS events?*
- d) *What nomenclature should the Commission adopt to describe the various periods of a PSPS event (i.e. the period during which the IOU has formed its emergency operations center but has not yet de-energized power lines, the period during which power is shut off, the re-energization period and the post-event time period)?*
- e) *Are there any other terms that must be defined to ensure effective communication between utilities, Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Critical Infrastructure and utility customers, e.g. "extreme wildfire conditions"?*

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(a) – Critical Facilities And Infrastructure:

CalCCA strongly supports the expansion of the definition of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure ("CFI") to include the transportation sector and proposes that the Commission expand the definition CFI to include additional critical facilities and infrastructure in other sectors. CalCCA believes that it is essential that the Commission address the impact of PSPS events on Department of Defense ("DOD") facilities, but believes that DOD facilities should be considered separately from other CFI, as DOD facilities raise their own unique set of national security, jurisdictional, resiliency, and confidentiality issues.

1. The Definition Of CFI Should Be Expanded To Include The Transportation Sector

CalCCA strongly supports expanding the definition of CFI to include certain transportation infrastructure and facilities that require electric power. These facilities are needed to preserve public health and safety by ensuring that communities have the ability to evacuate if necessary, during a PSPS event and that first responders have adequate roadway and transportation access to perform

their duties. In particular, the following transportation-sector facilities should be included in the definition of CFI:

- Road and rail tunnels or underground systems that require electric ventilation – an example of such a facility is the Tom Lantos Tunnels on Highway 1 which utilizes exhaust fans to allow safe operation;
- All electrically-powered railroad infrastructure required for safe operation, including railroad control towers, track switches, railroad crossing guards, communications;
- Airports and air traffic control facilities, including runway lighting, radar, and communications facilities;
- Bridges that rely on electricity to function (moving bridges or drawbridges); and
- Water transportation safety infrastructure, including lighthouses and navigational lighting and essential port and harbor safety infrastructure (including the facilities needed to operate pilot boats).

One of the challenges to notification will be ensuring that the proper authorities in charge of the various traffic control systems are notified (e.g. Highway 49 is under the jurisdiction of California Department of Transportation, not the local jurisdictions, and rail lines that have multiple parties owning different spurs). The IOUs should be directed to develop comprehensive contact lists for these systems in addition to other CFI.

2. DOD Facilities Should Be Addressed Separately And Not Included In The Definition Of CFI

CalCCA believes that it is essential that the Commission adopt comprehensive rules governing PSPS events as they relate to Department of Defense (DOD) facilities. However, DOD facilities should be treated as a separate class and should not be included in the definition of “critical facilities and infrastructure.” Unlike other critical facilities and infrastructure, many DOD facilities already have built-in energy resiliency, and are served by their own infrastructure, security, and first responders, meaning that there would be little benefit in disclosing the location of DOD facilities potentially affected by PSPS events to Public Safety Partners. In addition, disclosing information regarding DOD facilities, including the location of DOD facilities, the circuits and substations that

serve these facilities, load information regarding the facilities, could raise legitimate national security concerns. The Commission should not provide information about DOD facilities to parties in the same manner that it provides CFI information, and instead should work directly with the IOUs and DOD to develop separate PSPS protocols.

3. The Commission Should Adopt A Single Three-Tiered Definition Of CFI That Replaces Other Terms Like “Critical Facilities” And “Essential Service”

CalCCA proposes that the Commission adopt a single definition of “Critical Facilities and Infrastructure” to replace a number of terms currently being used in the PSPS context. This definition should be divided into three priority-based “tiers.”

CalCCA notes its concern with the lack of consistency in the use of the terms like “critical facilities,” “critical infrastructure,” and “essential facilities” in the wildfire and de-energization context. For instance, while Appendix A of D.19-05-042 includes defines “Critical Facilities and Infrastructure,” Appendix C of the same decision provides a slightly different definition for “Critical Facilities.” Similarly, PG&E not only has a designation for a “critical facility,” it also has a designation for “essential service.” It is unclear whether this designation covers the same facilities as the definition of CFI. CalCCA recommends that the Commission, in this Decision, adopt a *single definition* of the term “Critical Facilities and Infrastructure” (“CFI”) to be used in all de-energization and wildfire-related proceedings, and direct the use of this standard term rather than alternative terms and designations like “Critical Facilities” and “Essential Service.” As defined, CalCCA further requests that information provided to Public Safety Partners include all CFI.

The definition of CFI should include all facilities identified in the CFI list. To qualify as CFI, a facility should meet all three of the following criteria:

- The facility/infrastructure provides an essential public service;
- The facility/infrastructure relies on electricity to provide this service; and
- The unmitigated disruption of the service provided by the facility/ infrastructure, even on a temporary basis, would threaten public health and safety or cause a significant disruption to the normal functioning of public life.

CalCCA further proposes that the Commission divide CFI into three priority-based “tiers.” Tier 1 CFI would be defined as the facilities and infrastructure that present the most immediate

health and safety needs, such as first responder, hospital, and water facilities. Tier 2 CFI would be defined as facilities that are essential to public health and safety, but present a less immediate need than Tier 1 CFI, such as K-12 schools and blood banks. Tier 3 CFI would be defined as facilities that are required for the normal functioning of public life but present the least immediate health and safety needs – facilities like colleges and homeless shelters. A complete list of CFI with CalCCA’s proposed tier rankings is included as Attachment A to these comments.³

Dividing CFI into tiers will allow the Commission, the IOUs, and interested parties to better prioritize the PSPS notice provided to CFI operators, the targeting of resiliency resources, and the IOUs’ required efforts to assess CFI backup generation needs and (where needed) provide backup generation resources.

4. Additional Critical Facilities And Infrastructure Should Be Included In The Definition Of CFI.

While the definition of CFI adopted in D.19-05-042 was a good start at providing an “interim” list of the critical facilities and infrastructure that could be impacted or compromised by a de-energization event, as the Commission itself recognized this list was not meant to be exhaustive or restrictive, and the Commission explicitly left the list open for further examination in Phase 2 of this proceeding.⁴ CalCCA agrees with the facilities included in the D.19-05-042 list, but proposes that the list be expanded and clarified to include the following additional CFI. Specifically, CalCCA proposes that the CFI list be expanded as follows (with proposed deletions identified in strikethrough and proposed additions underlined):

- *Emergency Services Sector: Police Stations; Fire Stations; Emergency Operations Centers; emergency dispatch centers; designated disaster relief shelters/centers; municipal or county yards relied upon to support first responder vehicles and equipment, repair important infrastructure, and restore public services.*

³ Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) Priority Tier Categorization Chart (Appendix A). The Chart integrates D.19-05-042 Appendix A, Appendix C and adds CFI not included in either Appendix.

⁴ At 74-75.

- *Government Facilities Sector:* Schools; Jails and prisons; elementary schools; preschools; licensed daycare centers;⁵ schools and facilities for disabled students; children’s homes/shelters; middle schools; high schools; colleges and universities; homeless shelters.
- *Healthcare and Public Health Sector:* public health departments; medical facilities including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice facilities; residential/inpatient mental health facilities; assisted living facilities; cooling centers.
- *Energy Sector:* Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives; facilities needed to ensure the safety of natural gas infrastructure; community choice aggregators
- *Water and Wastewater Systems Sector:* Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater including, but not limited to: facilities needed to distribute water and maintain water pressure, including pump stations and water towers; water supply facilities, including transportation pipelines and canals, transportation pumps, and wells; facilities that ensure water potability, including treatment plants.
- *Communications Sector:* Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites (or their functional equivalents); communications facilities relied upon by first responders, emergency service and CFI operators; communication infrastructure, including radio broadcast facilities, used for emergency broadcasts; cell phone network infrastructure not relied upon by emergency services; internet infrastructure not relied upon by emergency services.

⁵ CalCCA notes that licensed daycare centers were included in the D.19-05-042 Appendix C definition of “Critical Facilities” but not the Decision’s Appendix A list of CFI.

- *Chemical Sector:* Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals (including explosive, highly flammable, radioactive, and highly toxic materials), and oil refineries, chemical plants, decommissioned nuclear power plants and associated spent fuel storage facilities, and chemical/fuel pipelines.

Like the facilities and infrastructure identified in the D.19-05-042 interim CFI list, each of CalCCA's proposed additions provides an essential public service; relies on electricity to provide this service; and the unmitigated disruption of the service provided by the facility/infrastructure, even on a temporary basis, would threaten public health and safety or cause a significant disruption to the normal functioning of public life.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(b) – Medical Baseline:

CalCCA believes there may be variations in terminology, applications and rates for medical baseline. PG&E lists its Rule 19 which defines medical baseline and provides significant details on the program. PG&E also maintains a website that explains the program and contains enrollment instructions. SCE's medical baseline tariff is not currently available on its website, but it does have a website that explains the program and provides an application and Schedule MB-E contains very basic information. SDG&E, similar to SCE, maintains a website with basic information on the program and enrollment forms. While each of the IOUs' websites appear to do a sufficient job in informing potential enrollees in the program about their options and enrollment process, the diversity and disparity between the three IOUs regarding the information contained in their rules is problematic. CalCCA believes it is prudent for all of the IOUs to have a detailed Rule on medical baseline rules, regulations and processes similar to PG&E's Rule 19. The IOUs published rules are a key component for stakeholders to use as they navigate any issues with eligibility or enrollment.

In addition, CalCCA is aware that some IOUs use the designation of life support ("LS") for medical baseline customers whose equipment is of immediate critical need for life and health. These types of designations and their definitions should be transparent and uniform across each of the IOUs. Unfortunately, CalCCA has been unable to review this designation and how it is determined.

CalCCA proposes that in Phase 2 the Commission adopt a single, uniform definition for "LS" customers, as well as rules requiring that the IOUs take comprehensive steps to identify all LS customers and LS residents within their service territories, maintain and regularly update their LS

lists, and make this information available to all Public Safety Partners, subject to compliance with the Commission’s privacy rules. Each IOU should include with this designation what type of equipment a customer has to allow for appropriate prioritization and services to protect life and health. In addition, PG&E allows customers to self-report as vulnerable for those who have a condition where their lives or health would be at risk should their electric or gas service be disconnected. These customers may not have a medical baseline designation. Based on the disparity of information easily accessible for parties to review, CalCCA proposes that the Commission conduct a review and comparison of IOU medical baseline tariffs to ensure consistency in programs and that all relevant and necessary information is provided to Public Safety Partners and first responders.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(c) – Transmission and Distribution:

The distinction between “distribution” and “transmission” facilities varies significantly, with different definitions adopted by the IOUs and interested agencies that differ in various contexts. For instance:

- PG&E’s transmission interconnection guide defines its transmission voltages as 60 kV, 70 kV, 115 kV, and 230 kV⁶
- California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”)-operated transmission lines are 70 kV or greater⁷
- North American Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) reliability standards distinguish between high voltage transmission lines (200 kV and greater), transmission lines (100 kV – 200 kV) and distribution lines (below 100 kV)⁸

For the purposes of clarity and consistency in PSPS communication and notifications, CalCCA recommends that the Commission define voltage for transmission and distribution based on the CAISO cutoff, with transmission lines defined as lines of 70 kV or greater, and distribution lines defined as lines that operate at less than 70 kV.

⁶ At page 2, available at:
<https://www.pge.com/includes/docs/pdfs/shared/rates/tariffbook/ferc/tih/13.pdf>.

⁷ Understanding Electricity, CAISO. Available at:
<http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/OurBusiness/Understanding-electricity.aspx>.

⁸ Tree Trimming and Vegetation Management, available at:
<https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/vegetation-mgt.asp>.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(d) – PSPS Timeline:

CalCCA supports consistency in terms and asks that when the Commission considers terms used for pre-, during, post- PSPS, those terms be simple, understandable, and easy to translate into multiple languages. Using terms consistent with phased processes such as stage, implement, restore or prepare, respond, recover, could facilitate communication. The PSPS terms should also be differentiated enough from disaster response terminology to avoid confusion or conflict with other statutes and regulations. Counties and cities may have the strongest suggestions for proper terminology. Whatever terms are chosen, they should be applied consistently across the state.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 1(e) – Other Definitions:

CalCCA understands from its members and interaction with local governments that a variety of terminology needs to be defined and made consistent, in addition to the terms the Commission included in Appendices A and C of D.19-05-042. Further, in defining the nomenclature of pre and post terminology, IOUs should identify the various terms they assign to facilities and defining the difference between the terms. In addition to the terms discussed below, the Commission should consider adopting consistent statewide definitions for terms like “vulnerable population,” “mobility impaired,” “hard to reach,” and “isolated community.”

1. The Commission Should Adopt A Definition For “PSPS Risk” That Is Distinct From “Wildfire Risk Area”

Currently, in the de-energization context the Commission and IOUs use a customer’s wildfire risk based on High Threat Fire District (“HTFD”) designations and maps as a proxy for a customer’s risk of experiencing a PSPS event. This is problematic, as wildfire risk only roughly correlates with PSPS risk due to the structure of the IOUs’ distribution and transmission systems. As PG&E noted in its September 24, 2019 *Progress Report on Implementation of De-Energization Guidelines*, “Although a customer may not live or work in a HTFD, their power may be shut off if their community relies upon a line that passes through an area forecast to experience gusty winds and dry conditions combined with a heightened fire risk.”⁹ Thus, a customer located within a Tier 1 (low fire risk) area may still be at a very high risk of a PSPS event if they are served by a high-risk transmission line or distribution circuit, for instance a circuit that also serves customers in a high fire risk area.

⁹ At 1.

To address the limited usefulness of HTFD maps in determining PSPS risk, CalCCA proposes that the Commission adopt the term “PSPS Risk,” defined as a customer’s risk of losing power due to a PSPS event (as opposed to a customer’s or area’s wildfire risk). CalCCA further Proposes that the Commission require that all distribution IOUs classify each of their *circuits* based on the projected risk that the circuit will experience PSPS over a given year and the projected duration (total) PSPS duration expected over the year (measured in total outage hours). The IOUs should be required to rank each of their circuits based on these projections, and higher risk circuits should be placed into the following “PSPS Risk Categories” defined as follows:

- High PSPS Risk – circuits in the top 10% (90th to 100th percentile) of the rankings (highest projected outage hours);
- Elevated PSPS Risk – circuits in the next 15% of the circuit rankings (75th to 90th percentile);
- Moderate PSPS Risk – circuits in the next 15% of the circuit risk rankings (60th to 75th percentile).

Each IOU should be required to provide all Public Safety Partners with complete maps and lists of all High, Elevated, and Moderate PSPS Risk circuits within its distribution service territory. The Commission should require that these lists be updated on an annual basis, based on operational information from the prior year. Each year, final updated lists and maps should be provided to the Commission and Public Safety Partners at least three months before the start of each fire season.

2. The Commission Should Adopt A Three-Tiered Definition Of The Term “Increased Risk Individuals That Extends Beyond Medical Baseline Customers And Categorizes Vulnerable Residents According To Vulnerability To Harm During A PSPS Event.

It is essential that the Commission recognize that an IOU’s list of Medical Baseline customers is not a comprehensive list of all individuals at an increased risk of harm due to a PSPS event. In recognition of this fact, the Commission should adopt the term “Increased Risk Individuals” (“IRI”) to refer to all individuals physically located within an IOU’s distribution service territory who are at a significantly greater than average risk of harm due to a PSPS-event. Further, in order to prioritize efforts to provide the most vulnerable individuals with notice, emergency response, evacuation services, and allocation of resources for emergency backup generation and energy storage, the Commission should adopt a three-tiered definition of IRIs:

- Tier 1 IRIs: individuals at a significant, immediate risk harm or death during PSPS events. This group should include individuals who rely on electrically powered medical equipment for immediate life-support needs.
- Tier 2 IRIs: individuals at a significant risk of serious harm or death during a PSPS event. This group should include vulnerable individuals such as:
 - Individuals who rely on electrically powered medical equipment for regular, but not immediate, life support of functions, including dialysis patients;
 - Individuals who rely on electrically powered wheelchairs for mobility;
 - Individuals who require regular doses of refrigerated medication to treat serious medical conditions;
 - Individuals at substantially increased risk of harm due to heat exposure due to age or medical conditions; and
 - Individuals undergoing chemotherapy or radiation therapy.
- Tier 3 IRIs: individuals at a substantially increased risk of harm during an extended PSPS event. This group should include vulnerable individuals such as:
 - Infants;
 - The elderly; and
 - Low income residents who may not have the resources to leave a PSPS affected area or prepare for a PSPS event.

More granular definitions that incorporate priority of need will improve the IOUs' and first responders' efforts to ensure safety when time is of the essence. Moving forward in this Rulemaking, the Commission should consider requiring that the IOUs develop and regularly update lists of IRIs and share these lists with Public Safety Partners during PSPS events.

Issue 2: Access and Functional Needs (AFN) Populations

- a) *What efforts can result in more complete contact lists of AFN utility customers while still maintaining legal and privacy protections?*
 - i. *What policies or laws affect the sharing of information between the electric IOUs and state and local governments to facilitate the identification of AFN populations for*

public safety purposes? What, if any, changes should be considered, and which entity or entities has the authority to make such changes?

- b) Are different methods of notification needed before, during, and after PSPS events depending on the needs of an individual AFN utility customer?*

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 2(a) – Contact Lists:

CalCCA recommends that the Commission consider further modifying D.06-06-066 as it relates to confidentiality, the Public Utilities Code sections 454.5(g) and 583, and the information needed by first responders and Public Safety Partners as defined in the Phase 1 Decision. CalCCA also recommends the Commission direct IOUs to provide county and city emergency planners with contact information for Medical Baseline and other electricity-dependent vulnerable customers, as defined, for outreach and planning purposes outside of an identified potential PSPS event. This will allow safety officials to identify resources needed in advance to ensure the safety of this population if and when a PSPS event occurs. Providing the information to emergency planners and responders only when a PSPS event is imminent or occurring may result in resources, such as portable generators or transportation to medical facilities may not be available to those who need them, thereby putting their lives at risk. Advanced information will aid with advanced planning and preparations.

PSPS events do not fit the classic definition of an emergency, and thus do not activate the normal triggers for initiating an emergency response. While risks to those medically dependent on electricity can be high during a PSPS event, providing medical baseline information gives first responders only a subset of affected vulnerable customers. The CPUC also should recognize that PSPS events can be particularly hard upon low income families that may not have the financial resources to prepare for a multi-day power outage. These customers are also particularly at risk due to lost work and compensation, lost access to social services during a PSPS event, and limited public transportation. The Commission should consider expanding the information provided to first responders and public safety partners to include designations of CARE and FERA customers, especially in advance of PSPS events for the purposes of local planning.

Local governments can use CARE/FERA information to identify areas within their communities that may need additional support during a PSPS event and to prioritize areas for IOUs in terms of resilient center placements. CARE/FERA may account for 10% to 30% of customers in a given area, and these customers include low income seniors, families with young children, and

individuals on public assistance or fixed incomes. The potential negative impacts to these vulnerable populations could be significant. These factors should be considered along with the PSPS Risk criteria for IOU risk assessments and placement of resilient centers with input from local governments. In addition, during declared emergencies the federal government will reimburse local governments if proper documentation is provided. The Commission should consider a process for reimbursement of local governments for response efforts related to PSPS events. In addition, the IOUs should be required to identify, maintain, and regularly update lists of IRIs in their service territories.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 2(a)(i) – Information Sharing Laws/Policies:

Based on the CCAs’ conversations with emergency professionals in their local jurisdictions, CalCCA proposes that as part of this reconsideration, the Commission should invite at minimum representatives from the following organizations to provide comments and direction on identifying critical information for AFN:

- (a) County Health and Human Services Directors;
- (b) Medical Health Operational Area Coordinator (“MHOAC”) for each jurisdiction;
- (c) Regional Disaster and Medical Health Coordinator (“RDMHC”) and regional disaster and medical health specialist (“RDMHS”);
- (d) California Office of Emergency Services (“CalOES”) Office of Access and Functional Needs representatives; and
- (e) California Department of Social Services Disaster Services Bureau representatives.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 2(b) – AFN Notification:

CalCCA requests the Commission consider the issue of Master meters and submeters as it relates to the ability of constituents to receive notifications. Customers with submeters (i.e., certain apartment complexes and mobile home parks) could not sign up for alerts initially because alerts currently require an account number, which submeters do not have. One of the IOUs implemented the idea of allowing any individual to register for notifications based upon their zip code. This raised the question: *what problems does this cause since zip codes are so broad, cross communities, counties and geography?* For example, in a PG&E June 2019 PSPS event, reliance upon the 5-digit

zip code identifier resulted alerts to local agencies stating impacted communities included individuals in Auburn, Nevada County. The city of Auburn is in Placer County, and the targeted area, an unincorporated area of Nevada County known as Lake of the Pines, is more than 10 miles away. The 5-digit zip code identifier may be too broad alone. However, the US Postal Service has an additional 4-digit sub area identifier which could be employed that could prove valuable in better refining the areas affected by a PSPS event. Refining the area to a 9-digit zip code identifier could provide more precise and effective notifications. CalCCA recommends that the Commission direct the IOUs to investigate additional options for permitting submeter individuals to have access to PSPS information that is more refined.

CalCCA also recommends the Commission consider revisiting its rulings on confidential customer data for the purposes of allowing first responders and Public Safety Partners to access necessary data in advance of PSPS events to prepare response plans, evacuation and transportation plans, and resilient center location evaluations. Data on Medical Baseline and CARE/FERA customers can assist in realistic assessment and development of these plans, and it can help communities prioritize where IOUs might best establish cooling and resilient centers.

Issue 3: PSPS Strategy And Decision-Making

- a) *What criteria should the Commission evaluate when assessing whether PSPS is being used as a measure of last resort?*
- b) *Would adopting standardized wildfire risk criteria (e.g. wind speeds, weather conditions, vegetation dryness conditions, etc.) across utilities promote the public safety, and if so, what criteria should be adopted?*

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 3(a) – Measure of Last Resort:

CalCCA notes that the Commission must be very clear regarding its definition of “measure of last resort” and should establish objective criteria and tools for situational awareness that the IOUs must use to determine whether PSPS event must be initiated. PG&E in its September 4, 2019 De-Energization Progress report notes that its Officer in Charge considers the availability of alternatives to a PSPS event and the ability to mitigate the risk of a PSPS event through notifications, community assistance locations, sectionalization, and the staging of restoration crews in advance.¹⁰ What is not included in this consideration is the number of customers impacted, the

¹⁰ PG&E Progress Report on Implementation of De-Energization Guidelines, September 4, 2019, at 1.

economic impact of the PSPS event, and the public safety risk from high heat conditions, which have their own public safety impacts. The establishment of criteria should not relieve the IOU of responsibility and liability in making PSPS decisions. In addition, the IOUs should document very clearly in their PSPS after incident reports all the information, data, conditions and issues they considered prior to initiating the PSPS event.

As the Commission gathers and reviews the PSPS after incident reports, the Commission could further refine and enhance the criteria IOUs need to consider before calling for a PSPS event. While wildfire risk criteria should inform IOU de-energization decision-making, they should not serve as a substitute for good judgement. The IOUs ultimately should be responsible for determining whether to trigger a PSPS event and their judgements should be subject to after-incident review.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 3(b) – Standardized Wildfire Risk Criteria:

CalCCA recommends that the Commission adopt a standard *minimum* set of criteria to be used by the IOUs in determining whether to call a PSPS event, and direct the IOUs to work with wildfire response experts like CalFire to determine whether additional criteria should be considered and how all criteria should be weighted, rather than having the Commission establish a single set of commonly weighted criteria “across utilities.” This recommendation stems from the diversity of climates and environments throughout California.¹¹ Wildfire risk will vary across regions, and the conditions that relate to increased risk should reflect the unique characteristics of the location. As climate change continues and other factors that need consideration arise (e.g. bark beetle infestations or drought impacts), the wildfire experts can help the IOUs develop baseline regional criteria that can be refined and enhanced with more line/circuit level to help identify when to employ the “measure of last resort.”

CalCCA proposes that the Commission adopt the following minimum list of criteria that all IOUs must measure, track, and consider when determining whether to call a PSPS event. These criteria should be tracked and assessed separately for each line/circuit. CalCCA’s proposed minimum criteria are as follows:

¹¹ U.S. Geological Survey Bioregions of the Pacific U.S., available at: https://www.usgs.gov/centers/werc/science/bioregions-pacific-us?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects.

- Weather data:
 - Wind speed
 - Humidity
 - Temperature
 - Last precipitation
- Surrounding vegetation (outside of right of way (“ROW”)) data:
 - Vegetation type (forest, conifer forest, brush, grassland, desert, etc.)
 - Vegetation density (quantified)
 - Vegetation moisture level (measured by drone or satellite)
- ROW condition:
 - Width of ROW
 - Last brush clearing
 - Last line patrol by arborist or forester
 - Current vegetation density in ROW (quantified)
 - Current vegetation moisture in ROW
- Line condition:
 - Line voltage
 - Pole height
 - Line ground clearance (lowest points at temperature and loading levels)
 - Pole type (wood, steel, undergrounded, etc.)
 - Conductor type (insulated vs. uninsulated)
 - Last line/pole inspection
 - Last inspection of safety devices installed on circuit
 - Age of poles, conductor, and safety devices

The Commission should require that all IOUs have the ability to collect required information (for instance, the ability to use satellites or drones to collect infrared vegetation moisture data) and consolidate all other data into a single database no later than May 1, 2020, before the start of the next fire season.

In addition, the Commission should require that before calling a PSPS event, the IOU balance the potential safety benefits to be gained from de-energizing each individual line/circuit

against the potential harms caused by de-energizing each line/circuit. In this proceeding, the Commission should solicit proposals for a standard methodology for accounting for and quantifying potential de-energization harms. If adopted, this standard methodology should be used by all IOUs. Until such a methodology is adopted, CalCCA proposes that all IOUs be required to assess the likelihood and extent of the potential harm caused by de-energization using, at a minimum, the following interim data points:

- Potential Economic Impact:
 - Estimated cost of lost frozen/refrigerated foods and medications, based on number of residential customers, grocery stores, pharmacies, and food industry facilities served by the line/circuit; and
 - Estimated economic harm caused by lost productivity and interrupted commercial activity – based on number and size of commercial, industrial, government, etc. facilities served by a given line/circuit; multiplied by number of days of de-energization, with a modifier accounting for weekday vs. weekend de-energizations.
- Potential Public Health / Safety Impact:
 - Heat danger – based on expected temperatures during de-energization, known and estimated number of individuals living in residences served by a line/circuit that are at increased risk harm from high heat conditions;
 - Water/sanitation danger – danger that de-energization will result in interrupted water service, contaminated drinking water, interruption of wastewater service, or public exposure to wastewater; and
 - Medical equipment danger – danger that de-energization will interrupt power supply to essential life-supporting medical equipment. Based on known/estimated number of life-support individuals residing in residences or medical facilities served by a line or circuit.
- Potential Impact On IRI, AFN, And Other Vulnerable Groups:
 - Number of IRIs served by the line/circuit;

- Number of Medical Baseline customers served by the line/circuit;
- Number of AFN customers served by the line/circuit;
- Number of CARE/FERA customers served by the line/circuit; and
- Whether the line/circuit serves a disadvantaged community (“DAC”).

Issue 4: Notification And Communication

- a) *What information should be communicated during a PSPS event as well as when power lines are being re-energized, and when (at what intervals) should that information be communicated?*
- b) *Where Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) territories exist, what role should CCAs play in communicating about PSPS events?*
- c) *Are additional communication guidelines required in the event of a transmission-level PSPS beyond those adopted in Resolution ESRB-8 and D.19-05-042?*

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 4(a) – PPS Communications:

1. **Proposed Required Communications With Public Safety Partners**

CalCCA members have had varied experiences with IOU information dissemination during PPS events. Based on these experiences and discussions with other Public Safety Partners, CalCCA proposes that all IOUs be required to establish a secure PPS web portal (“Portal”) that provides Public Safety Partners with all information necessary to perform their public health and safety and public service functions prior to, during, and after a PPS event. CalCCA appreciates PG&E’s effort in establishing its PPS Portal. While CalCCA believes that the information provided on PG&E’s Portal should be expanded and other aspects of the Portal can be improved and streamlined, as a general matter PG&E’s Portal provides an example of the kind of Portal-based information sharing that all IOUs should be required to implement.

However, it is not enough for the IOUs to implement PPS Portals – those portals must be used to provide Public Safety Partners with the information that they require. At a minimum, this information must include:

- A list of all lines/circuits (including sub-circuits and transmission lines) that the IOU plans to de-energize or has de-energized, with the lines/circuits identified by name, number, and connecting substation(s);

- For each line/circuit, the projected (or actual) date and time of de-energization, and the projected date and time of re-energization. These projections should be updated on a real-time basis;
- For each line/circuit, maps and Geographic Information System (“GIS”) files¹² clearly showing all addresses and parcels (with lot numbers) that are served by the circuit or all circuits that are served by the transmission line;
- For each line/circuit, a complete list of all addresses and parcels (with lot numbers) that are served by the line/circuit;
- For each line/circuit, a complete list of all CFI served by the line/circuit, including the CFI address, nature of the CFI (i.e. hospital, cell tower, nursing home, etc.), known backup generation resources installed at the CFI, and primary and secondary 24-hour emergency contacts for the CFI operators;
- For each line/circuit, maps and GIS files showing the physical location and spatial relationship to the line/circuit of all CFI served by the line/circuit; and
- Status of IOU efforts to notify all affected Public Safety Partners and CFI operators. This information should be updated in real time. All notification efforts should be time-stamped and include the nature of the contact effort (call, text message, email, etc.) whether the contact effort was automated or made by a human, and whether each PSP or CFI operator has confirmed receipt of notification.

In addition, the following information should be made available to public safety partners in a separate, password protected area each IOU’s PSPS Portal, with access limited to entities that are subject to the Commission’s existing customer information privacy rules or that have signed a binding agreement with the Commission to handle this information in accordance with the Commission’s privacy rules:

- For each line/circuit, a list of medical baseline customers, including address and contact information;

¹² When referencing GIS files, CalCCA refers to shapefiles, KMZ files, and other appropriate formats that would allow CCAs to view the information. CalCCA recognizes that the information requested could be consolidated into a single map with layers that may be turned on and off to allow viewing of different data.

- For each line/circuit, a list of all life support medical baseline customers and other customers and individuals who have notified the IOU that they rely on life support equipment, including address and contact information;
- For each line/circuit, a list of all known AFN customers, including address and contact information;
- For each line/circuit, maps and GIS files showing the location all medical baseline, life support, and AFN customers; and
- Status of IOU efforts to notify all medical baseline, life support, and AFN customers/residents. This information should be updated in real time. All notification efforts should be time-stamped, and include the nature of the contact effort (call, text message, email, in-person visit, etc.) whether the contact effort was automated or made by a human, and whether each customer or resident has confirmed receipt of notification.

2. Proposed Required Communications With CCAs

The information listed above is the absolute minimum amount of information needed for Public Safety Partners to effectively respond to PSPS events. Without knowing the specific circuits to be de-energized, and the addresses and parcels served by those circuits, it is virtually impossible for Public Safety Partners to direct resources to the impacted areas. And without knowing which critical facilities and infrastructure are served by each circuit, it is far more difficult for Public Safety Partners to prepare for potential public safety hazards (for instance from chemical facilities), breakdowns in communication networks, public health problems (for instance, from non-operational sanitation facilities), and myriad other potential issues. All information provided through the Portals should be updated on a real-time basis as additional information becomes available to the IOUs.

CCAs also have special PSPS information requirements in their role as electric generation service providers. In order to efficiently adapt procurement to potential PSPS events, avoid unnecessary procurement on behalf of customers who will be de-energized, and ensure adequate generation is available when de-energized customers come back online, CCAs need the following information:

- Historical load information for each circuit to be deenergized, based upon the specific calendar days for the PSPS event;
- Estimated load for each circuit to be deenergized during the PSPS period; and
- Load forecast for medical baseline and critical facilities customers to help discern

backup generation needs during a PSPS event.

This information should be provided to the CCAs either through a separate section of the Portal, or through direct communications with identified CCA representatives.

The load information provided to CCAs needs to be granular and specific, both in terms of the specific circuits/lines involved and time-specific load information. The CCAs have requested that the IOUs provide more relevant load data associated with a PSPS event to affected CCAs. During the June 2019 PG&E PSPS event, the load data that PG&E initially provided to MCE prior to the June 7-9 event was a so-called “P75 load forecast” by month. This is not the appropriate dataset from which to develop a load forecast for a PSPS event. A P75 monthly forecast averages out seasonal variation, which will skew results downward—especially since temperature and loads are higher during conditions which are likely to trigger PSPS events. It would be helpful to have more relevant information, such as a load forecast from PG&E based on actual conditions (seasonally or weather-adjusted). Lack of accurate or relevant data increases costs and affects CCA procurement and scheduling.¹³

The CCAs in PG&E territory have requested the circuit latitude and longitude information. PG&E codes this information as PREM_LAT and PREM_LONG. This information is critical for CCAs to improve the awareness of which customers will be de-energized during a PSPS event. The CCAs have requested that this information be provided as part of the standard 4013 provided during normal operations. D.04-12-046 issued in Phase 1 of the CCA implementation proceeding directs the utilities to provide all relevant information to CCAs and prospective CCAs, consistent with Section 366.2(c)(9). In that order the Commission stated:

“AB 117 is clear in its intent to require the utilities to provide CCAs all customer and usage data even before the CCA begins offering service.” We have found that AB 117 does not permit the utilities to second guess a CCA’s request for relevant information and we will not revisit the issue here. The utilities’ tariffs, therefore, shall include a provision that permits CCAs to access all relevant customer information, consistent with D.04-12-046 and the tariffs filed in compliance with D.04-12-046.¹⁴

This specific geographic information identifying the location of PSPS affected customers should not only be included in the standard 4013, but in all PSPS communications between IOUs and CCAs regarding affected customers. D.05-12-041 also notes that:

¹³ Joint CCA Protest filed in response to Advice Letter 5582-E at 9.

¹⁴ D.04-12-046 at 65.

Section 366.2(c)(9) requires the utilities to provide all relevant customer information to CCAs and prospective CCAs and the Commission has found that the statute does not permit the utilities to determine the types of customer information required by CCAs and prospective CCAs. Utility tariffs therefore may not limit access to such information.¹⁵

CCAs require this information for both functional and compliance reasons. Electric Rule 23 Section C5(d) notes that CCAs are responsible for notifying their scheduling coordinators of curtailment or other load reduction events ordered by the CPUC or CAISO. To meet this requirement, the CCAs must have the relevant information so it is incumbent upon the IOU to provide this information to the CCA.

CalCCA also asks that CCAs be provided a proactive heads up that IOUs are considering initiating a PSPS event. Since weather monitoring is a significant factor, and 10-day weather forecasts are readily available, CCAs should be notified at the beginning of this 10-day window. CCAs should also be notified of any changes to the IOUs' plans throughout this 10-day window. Once the IOU decides to initiate a PSPS event, the CCAs should be provided affected customer load data associated with accompany customer information (SAIDs). CalCCA has been led to understand that the IOU grid operations teams will have this information as they must let CAISO know this level of detail.

3. The IOUs Should Be Required To Secure Confirmed Notice From Public Safety Partners, CFI Operators, And IRIs

CalCCA understands that most of the IOU notice efforts thus far have occurred through automated text messages, emails, and phone calls. CalCCA believes that this level of notice, combined with public notification through local media, is appropriate for general customers. However, three key groups of customers require immediate priority notification of a potential PSPS event: 1) Public Safety Partners; 2) CFI Operators; and 3) life support customers and other highly vulnerable individuals. For these groups, the IOUs should be required to make continued efforts to provide notice until the IOU receives confirmation that notice has been received.

Public Safety Partners require as much prior notification as possible in order to prepare to fulfill their essential public safety functions in the face of a potential PSPS event. CFI operators require immediate notice in order to take steps to ensure that their facilities are able to continue to

¹⁵ D.05-12-041 at 12.

provide essential public services or do not threaten public health and safety in the event of an extended de-energization event. For instance, hospitals need as much prior notice as possible to check that their backup generation is operational, call in additional staff as needed, and prepare for additional PSPS-related emergency patients. Nursing homes and hospice facilities need adequate prior notice in order to relocate or evacuate residents if needed. Facilities that work with hazardous, explosive, or toxic materials may need to shut down or take additional steps while electricity is still available to prevent accidents. IRIs, including individuals who are at a significant risk of life-threatening harm due to a PSPS outage, need immediate, priority notice in order to evacuate the area, move to hospital facilities, or ensure that backup generation is fully fueled/charged and operational.

For these essential groups, automated phone calls, text messages, and/or emails from the IOUs are not adequate notice. Automated calls, especially from unfamiliar phone numbers during off hours, may be missed or disregarded and can easily be buried in the recipient's voicemail. Mass emails are subject to a variety of technical limitations and can be delayed or rejected by spam filters and similar security measures. Mass text messages raise similar technical concerns, especially since business lines and landlines may not have text message functionality.

In order to ensure that these groups receive adequate notice, CalCCA proposes that all IOUs be required to take the following steps:

- Send automated phone calls, emails, and text messages to Public Safety Partners, CFI Operators, and highly vulnerable individuals. All calls, emails, and texts should have an automated mechanism that allows the recipient to confirm receipt of the notice. For instance, upon receiving an automated call an individual could be asked to dial a certain code to confirm receipt. For automated text messages and emails, the recipient could be asked to send a reply text or email with the word "confirmed."
- For all Public Safety Partners, CFI Operators, and highly vulnerable individuals, the IOUs should be required to keep records, updated in real time, of each attempt to provide notice until confirmation is received. The records should include the exact time of attempted notice, the method of notice (distinguishing between automated and human contact attempts), and the time confirmation of notice was received.
- If an IOU is not able to secure confirmation through automated notice, the IOU should be required to make all necessary attempts to provide timely notice through

non-automated means, including telephone calls and in-person visits from PG&E staff.

- For CFI Operators, IOU efforts to secure confirmation of notice through non-automated means should be prioritized based on the CFI's Tier, with priority notice efforts directed to Tier 1 CFI operators.

4. The Commission Should Address Privacy And Confidentiality Issues Related To PSPS Disclosures In A Careful Policy Review

CalCCA further proposes that the Commission adopt the general rule that all PSPS-related information should be provided to every Public Safety Partner without requiring the execution of a non-disclosure agreement or other limitations to access that may chill information sharing and lifesaving efforts unless there is a specific, reasonable, and overriding privacy, confidentiality, or other policy reason for limiting access. Of the information that CalCCA has identified as necessary for Public Safety Partners in general, only two categories legitimately raise such concerns: 1) identifying information for medical baseline or other vulnerable customers; and 2) locational and contact information for CFI facilities whose location and nature are not a matter of public record, and whose operators have articulated a specific reason (for instance security or market sensitivity) for keeping this information confidential.

These are complex issues that require a careful policy analysis that balances the needs of PSPs to personal or confidential information in order to conduct life-saving efforts and provide essential services with a variety of privacy and confidentiality considerations. CalCCA recommends that in this proceeding the Commission make it a priority to conduct a careful, deliberate consideration of these issues and adopt a single set of PSPS privacy and confidentiality rules that applies to all IOUs and PSPs (CalCCA notes that some PSPs may not be CPUC-jurisdictional, and may need to execute a standardized, CPUC-approved non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”).

CalCCA further believes that the Commission should take immediate action to prohibit the IOUs from making Public Safety Partner access to PSPS Portals or other essential PSPS information contingent on the execution of an overbroad, IOU-developed NDA. This is a matter of immediate concern – PG&E has informed a number of CCAs, Cities, and Counties that access to a significant amount of essential PSPS information is going to be made contingent upon the execution of an NDA drafted by PG&E. CalCCA fundamentally opposes this approach. There is no legitimate policy basis for denying any Public Safety Partner access to all PSPS information other than the two

categories identified above. Further, these two categories are already protected by Commission privacy rules, rendering an NDA unnecessary for state and local entities that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction on these matters. For CCAs in particular NDAs are doubly unnecessary, as CCAs are fully subject to the Commission's privacy rules and already have NDAs with their distribution IOUs in place. CalCCA further notes that it has the right to access this information under Electric Rule NO. 23, Section C3(c) which states "A CCA has the option to request additional customer information pursuant to Schedule E-CCAINFO",¹⁶ CCAs have the right to request additional information related to their customers.

In addition to being unnecessary, IOU-imposed NDAs that have not been reviewed by the Commission raise significant safety concerns. Overbroad NDAs may be used by IOUs to shield themselves from investigations, liability, and post-facto reasonableness reviews of their de-energization decisions and wildfire prevention efforts. NDAs may vary between IOU and IOU, and within an IOU, from one Public Safety Partner to another, potentially complicating and delaying the sharing information and creating a chilling effect on lifesaving efforts.

While CalCCA strongly supports the protection of customer privacy, CalCCA does not believe that confidentiality requirements should be unilaterally adopted and enforced by the IOUs through contracts that have been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commission. In order to address this problem, CalCCA asks that the Commission take the following steps:

- The Commission should instruct the IOUs to provide all Public Safety Partners with access to all Portal information *without having to sign a non-disclosure agreement* with the exception of the two categories of information identified above.
- The Commission should require that lists of medical baseline customers and non-public, confidential CFI facilities be made accessible to all Public Safety Partners are subject to the Commission's customer privacy rules.
- The Commission should instruct the IOUs that they may only require an NDA to access PSPS information for the two categories of information listed above, and an NDA may only be required of Public Safety Partners that are not subject to the Commission's privacy rules.

¹⁶ Electric Rule No. 23, Section C 3 (c) at 12.

- The Commission should prohibit the IOUs from requiring or enforcing NDAs that go beyond the specific scope of protecting these two categories of information in the same manner as the Commission’s existing privacy rules.
- The Commission should require that all NDAs be temporary, valid only until the Commission’s adoption of PSPS Privacy and Confidentiality Rules in this proceeding.

5. PSPS Notice Should Be Provided To All Public Safety Partners In Both Affected And Neighboring Jurisdictions

CalCCA proposes that notification of PSPS events extend to the Public Safety Partners that neighbor areas slated for a PSPS event. This will help ensure neighboring communities that may wish to coordinate resources to respond to a PSPS event are on notice. CalCCA also underscores the need to notify all areas potentially affected by a PSPS event due to the configuration of the networked transmission system. PG&E noted in its introduction to its PSPS Program Report, that beginning in 2019, it expanded its PSPS program will include all electric lines (transmission and distribution) that pass through High Fire Threat Districts (HTFDs). PG&E further noted that: “Although a customer may not live or work in a HTFD, their power may be shut off if their community relies upon a line that passes through an area forecast to experience gusty winds and dry conditions combined with a heightened fire risk.”¹⁷ PG&E further states that:

PG&E will then conduct power flow assessments and fault-duty (short circuit) studies in coordination with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure that the initial transmission PSPS scope is feasible and will not compromise reliable bulk power system operations. This step is critical to support compliance with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards and that de-energizations will not negatively impact bulk power system integrity. This assessment process will identify the total count of customers who are likely to be impacted by a transmission PSPS event, including any publicly owned utilities/electric cooperatives, adjacent jurisdictions, and small/multi-jurisdictional utilities, as well as other facilities interconnected at the transmission level. This step may also result in the identification of additional downstream PG&E distribution customers that would be impacted by transmission de-energization. Because of the configuration of the networked transmission system, customers and entities impacted by a transmission PSPS event may not be directly located within the weather event footprint itself or in a HTFD location, as designated by the CPUC.¹⁸

¹⁷ PG&E Progress Report on Implementation of De-Energization Guidelines, September 4, 2019, at 1.

¹⁸ Id. at 4-5.

Because the impacts from a PSPS event can have far-reaching impacts, beyond the scope of the area with conditions that would trigger an event, CalCCA recommends that PSPS notifications be expanded to include all impacted and neighboring areas. In addition, CalCCA recommends that the Commission should develop a list of criteria for prioritizing the allocation of resiliency resources and creation of cooling centers that includes but is not limited to likelihood of PSPS Risk, the designations of Tier-2 and Tier-3 HTFD, the number of customers impacted, the economic impacts, CFI impacts, and community and AFN needs. These criteria should be developed through workshops with stakeholders.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 4(b) – Role of CCAs:

The responsibility for notification lies strictly upon the IOUs under the existing PSPS guidelines. This approach is appropriate given the IOUs are the grid operators and the ultimate PSPS decisionmakers. CCAs lack the necessary information to adequately and accurately provide communications about PSPS events. CCAs necessarily must receive this information from an IOU. CCAs have received inconsistent information from IOUs associated with PSPS events and such information-sharing regularly diverges from agreed-upon protocols. Placing an expectation on CCAs to communicate about PSPS events creates a risk that incorrect and untimely information will be shared which presents serious health and safety risks.

This approach is supported by Electric Rule No. 23 C5(a) which states regarding, “Customer Inquiries Related To Emergency Situations And Outages” that “PG&E shall be responsible for responding to all inquiries related to distribution or transmission service, emergency system conditions, outages and safety situations. Customers contacting the CCA with such inquiries shall be referred directly to PG&E.” SCE has similar language in its Electric Rule 23, and SDG&E’s Electric Rule 27 also contains this language.

It is appropriate that the IOUs have the sole responsibility to provide notice of possible PSPS events and regular updates to customers, Public Safety Partners, and CFI operators, and that the IOUs bear all responsibility for mitigating the impacts of PSPS events through appropriate communications. The IOUs are responsible for building and maintaining their transmission and distribution systems, which serve all bundled and CCA customers. All CCA customers remain IOU transmission and distribution customers. The IOUs have the sole power to call a PSPS event and are

the only parties with direct access to the system, operational, and other information used to determine the time, place, and duration of an event.

The CCAs are community-based public agencies that have an interest in protecting the well-being of their customers and communities. The Commission recognized this role in the D.19-05-042, classifying CCAs as “Public Safety Partners.” The CCAs have requested the IOUs share the list of vulnerable customers and CFI within the respective CCA service areas prior to PSPS events. As local public agencies, CCAs may be able to support the development of PSPS mitigation and preparation efforts in advance of these events. CCAs may be able to reduce the burden of PSPS events by implementing programs that provide storage and/or generation resources to support resilience at CFI or vulnerable customer locations within their service areas. These opportunities should be given appropriate weight and focus as part of ongoing and future Commission proceedings. As such, CCAs should be provided an opportunity to administer programs to develop and operate microgrid facilities supported by new grants and funding opportunities. that could mitigate impacts of PSPS events but could also represent opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address resource adequacy and energy supply issues. Any discussion of a microgrid or resilient center installation within a CCA’s service area should include a representative from the respective CCA. Further, as microgrids and other PSPS mitigation tools have interconnection components, CalCCA recommends that the Commission consider, as part of the Phase 2 Track 2 of this proceeding, performing analysis of the interconnection processes with a focus upon streamlining to reduce delays.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 4(c) – Additional Communications Guidelines:

While the PSPS proceeding addresses many issues, the Commission does not consider in its Scoping Memo for Phase 2 Track 1 how to address increased localized emissions and carbon dioxide emissions from the use of generators at large facilities as a result of PSPS, and the crossover issue of California Air Resources Board air quality permit restrictions and penalties for this equipment. Further, CalCCA notes that the Commission needs to include direction to the IOUs for creating documentation of PSPS protocols and guidelines per Appendix B of the Phase 1 Decision. These issues should be explored in the context of transmission- and distribution-level PSPS events.

Issue 5: PSPS And Transmission Lines

- a) *What coordination is required between the electric IOUs and public safety partners, the California Independent System Operator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and others to ensure safe PSPS events, which require the shut-off of transmission lines?*
- i. *In addition to those listed above, with whom must the electric IOUs coordinate to prepare for and notice transmission [level PSPS events, e.g. adjacent affected jurisdictions, publicly owned utilities, etc., and how should such coordination occur?*
- b) *How should the Commission evaluate the impacts of transmission line PSPS versus distribution level PSPS, and what guidelines should be adopted to sufficiently prepare for and mitigate those impacts? For example, some facilities, such as airports and large industrial facilities, may be connected at the transmission level and may be impacted differently than in the case of distribution outages.*

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 5(a) – Coordination for Transmission-Level PSPS:

CalCCA has addressed the communication and data needs that exist for CCAs during PSPS events. It is essential that the Commission put public safety first and ensure that all Public Safety Partners, including CCAs, be provided with full notice and all relevant information regardless of whether a PSPS event occurs at the distribution or the transmission level. CalCCA notes with significant concern that PG&E has indicated they may not provide CCAs with any information in advance of a transmission-level PSPS event claiming it may be “market sensitive information.” In Opening Comments of Track 1 of this proceeding, PG&E argued:

The PD identifies municipal utilities and Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) as “public safety partners,” with whom the IOUs are required to communicate about a potential PSPS in advance of informing the general public. PG&E understands and appreciates the need to coordinate with these two entities, however, this requirement could conflict with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulations. These two types of entities are electric transmission market participants, with whom FERC’s standards of conduct prohibit sharing nonpublic information about the operation of the transmission grid, including de-energization of transmission lines. PG&E asks the Commission to modify the PD to provide an exception to only require providing notice in advance of notifying the general public to the extent it would not violate any other laws, regulations, or standards.¹⁹

Most recently, in PG&E’s September 4, 2019 PPS De-energization Implementation Progress report, PG&E states that it has sought FERC’s guidance regarding providing notice of transmission PPS information to market participants, and may change its current practice of sharing

¹⁹ PG&E Opening Comments at 7-8.

PSPS information with market participants based on FERC's input.²⁰ The Commission should categorically reject this argument. Tellingly, despite prompting from the California Municipal Utilities Association in its Reply Comments for the Proposed Decision of Track 1 of this proceeding,²¹ the IOUs were entirely unable to provide any actual example of how a CCA program could use PSPS information to gain an inappropriate market advantage. To the contrary, the only apparent market-related use of PSPS information is to allow CCAs to protect their customers by reducing procurement (and associated costs) on behalf of load that will lose service in a PSPS event. Further, advanced notice that the utility is considering a PSPS event is not equivalent to outage information because the PSPS event may not actually be called. If FERC rules require that transmission PSPS information be made public simultaneously to all market participants, then the Commission should require such publication rather than allowing the IOUs to withhold advanced notice of possible transmission-level PSPS outages. Most importantly, it must be recognized that PSPS events are unplanned outage events that create risks to the health and safety of all impacted communities and individuals. The public safety interests therein should outweigh the specter of abuse of such information by market participants.

The Commission should direct the IOUs to collaborate and cooperate with CCAs when CCAs propose to develop local microgrids, islanding for local generation, power-routing alternatives, resilient center location, and other response or mitigation efforts related to PSPS activities. The upcoming implementation of SB 1339 (Stern) in Rulemaking ("R.") 19-09-009 represents a substantial opportunity to accelerate the ability of all stakeholders to increase community resiliency through deployment of microgrids. To facilitate coordination with CAISO, the IOUs should share the communication they provide to CAISO regarding load curtailment and all circuit, substation, and transmission line shutoffs associated with PSPS events with the respective CCAs.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 5(a)(i) – Additional Coordination:

CalCCA provides no comment at this time but reserves the right to address this issue going forward.

²⁰ Pacific Gas and Electric Company Progress Report on Implementation of De-Energization Guidelines, September 4, 2019 Section 2.3.3. FERC Standards of Conduct page 5.

²¹ California Municipal Utilities Association, Reply Comments page 2.

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 5(b) – Evaluation of Transmission PSPS Impacts:

Outages for facilities connected at the transmission-level can be a significant safety concern. Where possible, the Commission should encourage innovative approaches to grid management in cases where the affected IOU has an intertie with another provider who could provide an alternate route for power. Alternative interties may exist for areas subject to PSPS events and the Commission should direct IOUs to investigate options for providing power through alternative routes by other grid operators proactively. As part of this identification, the IOUs and other infrastructure operators should identify where the capacity of the lines might need adjusting. The Commission should direct utilities requesting load capacity increase for transmission and distribution lines to evaluate the possible use of the lines for mitigation in PSPS events in areas where other mitigation factors might not serve as efficiently.

Issue 6: Lessons Learned

- a) *Are there lessons learned from recent PSPS events (since adoption of D.19-05-042) that inform the topics under consideration in Track 1?*

CalCCA Proposal In Response To Issue 6(a) – Lessons Learned

During previous PSPS events, the CCAs learned that while CCA might not be directly impacted by a pending PSPS event, if its neighboring CCA is affected, crossover issues may arise (e.g. CCAs may look to provide mutual aid/support). The Commission should expand notification of pending PSPS events to all impacted and adjacent CCAs in an IOU service territory. CCAs should be provided notice of possible PSPS events at least 10 days in advance and as soon as PG&E reasonably believes that a PSPS event is likely to occur. CCAs should be provided immediate notice when PG&E activates its Emergency Operations Center (“EOC”).

In comments on PG&E’s after incident report for the June 2019 PSPS event, Marin Clean Energy, Peninsula Clean Energy, and Pioneer Community Energy noted information and detail deficiencies in the documentation. CalCCA supports the requests put forth from the these CCAs and further requests that the Commission consider opening discussion with first responders and public safety partners regarding the types of information the IOUs should include in the PSPS after incident reports including: (1) all information considered in determining to call a PSPS event; (2) notification to water and wastewater agencies and communication providers; (3) attempts to provide notice to critical facility/infrastructure operators and vulnerable customers; and (4) details on methods and

who IOUs attempted to contact and whether those contacts were successful so that first responders, CCAs, and local agencies can assist in continuous improvement in notification protocols and information.

IV. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN PHASE 2, TRACK 2

CalCCA recognizes that the Scoping Memo for Phase 2 Track 2 of the proceeding is still in development. As preliminary comments, CalCCA offers the following suggestions for inclusion in the Scoping Memo. Further, CalCCA asks the Commission to provide opportunities for parties to comment on the Scoping Memo and Ruling for Phase 2 Track 2 as the questions offered below illustrate the need for deeper discussions, risks, sector impact identification and refinement of the aspects of the PSPS proceeding. Additional issues for Track 2 may arise in response to the Comments of other Parties and the Scoping Memo and Ruling once it is issued. CalCCA reserves the right to raise additional issues that should be within the scope of Track 2: CalCCA comments as follows:

1. Lessons Learned

- a. *Based upon recent PSPS events since adoption of D.19-05-042, what changes or updates to the guidelines adopted in that decision and Resolution ESRB-8 should the Commission consider?*

CalCCA provides no comment at this time.

2. Notification and Communication

- a. *What are the impacts on communication services during a PSPS event (when power is shut-off)?*

PSPS events will impact our primary modes of communication (e.g. cell phone and internet networks) which present a serious concern for communication to the affected public and coordination and communication among first responders, Public Safety Partners, and CFI. This topic merits a deeper discussion and the Commission should conduct workshops with Telecomm electricity, and other service providers to explore opportunities to mitigate the impacts of a PSPS event.

- b. *What communication parameters should the Commission require of the electric IOUs with all affected populations during a PSPS event when there may be a loss of*

critical communication infrastructure?

This issue is relevant to all Californians but is acutely relevant to vulnerable populations subject to increased risk and should be explored further in track 2.

- c. *How should communications occur if there is a loss of critical communication infrastructure?*

Adequate tools and plans to reach vulnerable individuals should be developed to ensure the safety of those at-risk populations. The Commission should explore this in track 2.

- d. *What guidelines should the Commission adopt for notification and communication if local jurisdictions choose not to form an emergency operations center (EOC) during a PSPS event?*

- e. CalCCA provides no comment at this time and encourages the Commission to explore this issue in track 2. *Should the Commission require standardized messaging across electric IOUs to avoid confusion and increase understanding by customers and public safety partners, and if so, how should the Commission go about adopting that standardized messaging?*

The Commission should consider using workshops to open the discussion about messaging, seeking stakeholder direction with a look toward developing consensus where possible. Coordination between IOUs and all partners should result in more efficient communication and avoid confusion and duplication.

- f. *How should non-residents, such as tourists, who are in an area that will be affected by a PSPS event be notified and what is the role of the utility versus other public safety partners in identifying these populations and providing notice?*

The Commission needs to consult with the California Department of Tourism, and the regional and local Tourism bureaus and CalTrans which controls the electronic highway alert signs and safety broadcast messages. Because PSPS events have such a far-reaching impact, the Commission should look beyond traditional partners.

- g. *Are additional notification and communication processes needed for PSPS events that affect customers outside of California's borders (e.g. Oregon, Nevada, Arizona,*

Mexico) or that may impact Federal (e.g. Yosemite National Park) or tribal lands?

The Commission should direct the IOUs to notify Vessel Traffic System and Vessel Traffic Information Systems at the Ports of PSPS events which will have direct bearing on all cargo and passenger vessel traffic. Further, the US Coast Guard could provide alerts to ships, particularly cruise ships planning Port visits to the PSPS event area allowing the ships to make alternative arrangements.

The Commission should further investigate the impacts of PSPS events on interstate commerce as it relates to the shipment and storage of goods and materials including but not limited to perishable goods, train cargo, and the pipeline infrastructure for petroleum products, where PSPS not only affects commerce but could also impact safety. In SCE's territory, special risk assessment should be conducted for the various oil platforms off the California coast. The Commission should request input from the State Lands Commission regarding the offshore and onshore facility risks.

- h. What strategies can be deployed to facilitate notice of PSPS events to speakers of non-English languages beyond those required in D.19-05-042?*

CalCCA encourages all outreach and notifications to customers to be designed to be understood by all customers. The IOUs should explore multiple channels of information including Community Based Organizations ("CBOs"). The Commission should explore this issue further in track 2.

- i. Are there any other guidelines the Commission should adopt in order to ensure effective notification and communication before, during and after a PSPS event?*

CalCCA provides no comment at this time.

3. Mitigation

- a. What services are needed during a PSPS event to mitigate risks to public safety, e.g. cooling centers, battery charging stations, access to drinking and bathing water?*

All of these services will mitigate risks to public safety. This issue should be explored through workshops and in coordination with local communities, since needs may differ among communities.

- i. *Do the services needed during a PSPS event differ from the services needed during other types of electrical outages?*

Yes, primarily because the scale and duration of PSPS events may exceed other types of electrical outages. Additionally, the warm windy and fire-prone weather conditions that may trigger a PSPS event will be different than during other outages, some of which occur during colder stormy conditions.

- b. *Resolution ESRB-8 required that the IOUs help critical facilities evaluate preparedness for PSPS events, up to and including the provision of back-up generation. Who should bear the cost of back-up generation and should the Commission support the use of a specific back-up generation resource to mitigate environmental effects? Are existing Commission programs sufficient for these purposes?*

CalCCA provides no comment at this time.

- c. *What mitigation measures should be considered for PSPS events that result in loss of power for more extended periods of time?*

CCAs are well positioned to collaborate with the IOUs and third party distributed energy resource (“DER”) providers to develop microgrids and other resilience solutions in ways that align the entities’ respective roles. In a general sense, those roles include IOUs as the deployer of poles and wires, CCAs as the primary electricity provider in their service areas, and DER providers as equipment providers. CCAs also have strong connections to other local government units and their local communities to be able to identify and develop community-specific solutions. In addition, because many CCAs have specific GHG reduction goals, CCAs have an interest in providing lower GHG options than traditional diesel generators for resilience services. These efforts will interact with the development of microgrid tariff (R.19-09-009), distribution resources planning (R.15-08-013), and integrated distribution energy resources proceedings (R.15-10-003) to determine how to develop these services among other Commission proceedings.

- d. *Should the electric IOUs be required to consider claims for losses as a result of PSPS?*

Yes, but it should depend on the situation and the loss that resulted. Since these are discretionary actions, the IOUs may need to bear the financial responsibility to cover such claims. Imposing this liability on IOUs may help ensure that PSPS events are truly a “measure of last resort.” However, the exact parameters for this liability should be developed in further workshops and comments.

- e. What is the relationship between homeowner insurance/renter’s insurance policies and losses as a result of PSPS events?*

CalCCA provides no comment at this time.

4. Should electric customers be billed for electric service during a PSPS event?

Generally, the customers who have lost power during a PSPS event should not be billed for the variable costs, if any costs, of electric service. The relationship between PSPS shutoffs by IOUs and charges for energy services by LSEs and for delivery services by IOUs involves complexities that should be considered with stakeholder input. The cost impacts and potential cost-shifting should be considerations to be explored.

5. PSPS Strategy

- a. How can the Commission ensure that the utilities are taking proactive measures to reduce the need for PSPS in the future (e.g. grid hardening, vegetation management, resiliency zones, etc.)? Should this issue be addressed in this proceeding or within the context of R.18-10-003?*

This is a critical issue, especially since it involves a balancing of costs of PSPS events or wildfires against the costs of proactive measures. This is a policy question that should be further explored in track 2. The state should develop new tools to quantify these impacts and support decision making.

- b. Should PSPS be weighed as a strategy differently if an area lacks distribution or transmission redundancy or if an area is located at the end of a transmission line?*

Generally speaking, redundant transmission resources will mitigate the impacts of PSPS events. However, redundancy for an area alone may not be useful if the area itself must be deenergized. CalCCA believes that this will be a community-specific and an event-specific analysis, with which local CCAs will be well positioned to assist.

6. Re-Energization of Power Lines

- a. *Consistent with the sharing of criteria required in D.19-05-042, should the IOUs be required to share the criteria used to determine when to re-energize power lines with Public Safety Partners?*

Yes. Publicly available guidelines should allow the public to develop a sense of the potential schedule for re-energization.

If so, what information should be shared, at what level of detail and according to what timeline?

The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

- b. *Any other issues not covered under notification/communication that are necessary to ensure the safe re-energization of power lines after a PSPS event.*

CalCCA provides no comment at this time.

7. Requests to Delay PSPS Events?

- a. *Should the electric IOUs delay PSPS events, if requested?*

The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

If so, what entities should be permitted to request delays?

The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

What criteria should the electric IOUs use to consider a request to delay?

The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

8. Education and Outreach

- a. *The electric IOUs are currently engaging in a comprehensive PSPS and wildfire safety/preparedness campaign. How should the Commission evaluate the effectiveness of that campaign?*

CalCCA provides no comment at this time.

- b. *Is additional education and outreach needed beyond that currently being undertaken by the*

electric IOUs and other state partners to educate the public on PSPS events, including what is entailed during a PSPS event, what tools are available to the public during these events, what to do in an emergency and how to receive information alerts during a power shutoff, and who the public should expect to hear from and when?

Education and outreach for the public on PSPS events should continue and should be evaluated for effectiveness. The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

9. Evaluation of PSPS Events

- a. *Should the Commission evaluate each PSPS event for reasonableness beyond the process adopted in Resolution ESRB-8 and D.19-05-042, and if so, what process should the Commission use to do so?*

The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

- b. *What criteria should the Commission adopt to evaluate reasonableness of PSPS events?*

The Commission should explore this issue through stakeholder feedback in track 2.

V. CONCLUSION

CalCCA appreciates the opportunity to provide this proposal and comments to the Commission.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Irene Moosen

Irene K. Moosen
Director, Regulatory Affairs
**CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
CHOICE ASSOCIATION**
One Concord Center
2300 Clayton Road, Suite 1150
Concord, CA 94521
Email: Regulatory@cal-cca.org

APPENDIX A: Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) Priority Tier Categorization

KEY:

Blue Text – Already Included in D.19-05-042 Appendix A

Green Text – Included in D.19-05-042 Appendix C but not D.19-05-042 Appendix A

Red Text – Not Included in Either D.19-05-042 Appendix A or C

Sector	Tier 1 Very High Priority – immediately needed during PSPS event to protect public health and safety.	Tier 2 High Priority – Important to public welfare but not immediately needed	Tier 3
Emergency Services Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police Stations • Fire Stations • Emergency Operations Centers • Emergency Dispatch Centers • Designated disaster relief shelters / centers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipal or county yards relied upon to support first responder vehicles / equipment, repair important infrastructure, and restore public services. 	
Government Facilities Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jails and Prisons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • K-12 schools, pre-schools. • Licensed daycare centers. • Schools that specialize in educational services for the disabled. • Children’s homes (foster care) • Homeless shelters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colleges and Universities
Healthcare and Public Health Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hospitals • Hospice • Skilled nursing facilities • Nursing homes • Public health departments • Healthcare Facilities • Residential / inpatient mental health facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blood banks • Dialysis Facilities 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assisted Living Facilities Cooling centers 		
Energy Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilities needed to ensure safety of natural gas infrastructure. 	Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> interconnected publicly owned utilities; electric cooperatives 	
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector	Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater including, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilities needed to distribute water and maintain water pressure, including pump stations and water towers. Water supply facilities, including transportation pipelines and canals, transportation pumps, and wells. Facilities that ensure water potability, including treatment plants. 		
Communications Sector	Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites (or their functional equivalents);	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cell phone network infrastructure to the extent that it is not relied upon by first responders or for emergency notifications. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internet infrastructure to the extent that it is not relied upon by first responders or for

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communications facilities relied upon by first responders, emergency services, and CFI operators. • Communication infrastructure, including radio broadcast facilities, used for emergency broadcasts. 		emergency notifications.
Chemical Sector	<p>Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals. [including explosive, highly flammable, radioactive, and highly toxic materials].</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil refineries • Chemical plants • Decommissioned nuclear power plants and associated spent fuel storage facilities. • Chemical/fuel pipelines. 		
Transportation Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air Traffic Control (and related infrastructure, including radar, communications, runway/navigational lights) • Essential Railroad Safety Facilities / Infrastructure (control towers, communications, rail switches) • Road/Rail tunnels or underground systems that rely on electricity for ventilation. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airport terminals and related facilities.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bridges that rely on electricity to function safely, especially moving bridges.• Essential port and harbor safety infrastructure, including navigational lights and pilot boat facilities.		
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